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Abstract. In this paper we propose a novel approach to identify anomalies in DNS traf-
fic. The traffic time-points data is transformed to a string, which is used by new fast ap-
proximate string matching algorithm to detect anomalies. Our approach is generic in its 
nature and allows fast adaptation to different types of traffic. We evaluate the approach 
on a large public dataset of DNS traffic based on 10 days, discovering more than order of 
magnitude DNS attacks in comparison to auto-regression as a baseline. Moreover, the 
additional comparison has been made including other common regressors such as Linear 
Regression, Lasso, Random Forest and KNN, all of them showing the superiority of our 
approach. 
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1 Introduction 
Domain Name System (DNS) is the white pages of the Internet allowing to map host-
names/domains to IP addresses and it facilitates the communication of devices over the Inter-
net. DNS is based on Standards (RFCs 1034, 1035-> STD13, Updated by a number of RFCs). 
It’s a distributed and hierarchical database. Since DNS is an open ASCII protocol with no 
encryption, it is quite vulnerable for many known security holes. It uses a very rudimentary 
authentication mechanism which is based only on the SIP, port and transaction ID and, there-
fore, naively trusts source of information. Caching allows to bypass authoritative records and 
to store unreliable information in many locations in the internet.  
Recently, it was reported that FireEye’s Mandiant Incident Response and Intelligence 
teams have identified a wave of DNS hijacking that has affected dozens of domains belonging 
to government, telecommunications and internet infrastructure entities across the Middle East, 
North Africa, Europe and North America [33]. Additionally, the Internet Corporation for As-
signed Names and Numbers (ICANN), which supervises the DNS reported on February 2019 
that the DNS servers for a variety of prominent targets across the world have been subject to 
a rush of attacks known as DNS hijacking attacks [34].  
Several known malicious actions detectable by analyzing DNS data are known to the 
community: (D)DoS, Cache poisoning, Tunneling, Fast flux, Zone transfer hijacking, Dynam-
ic update corruption and few others. To address the serious concerns related to the DNS at-
tacks, we introduce unsupervised learning method based on string matching algorithm. We 
chose to deal with the unsupervised method due to the existence of large amount of unlabeled 
traffic data. Our approach is general and fast (it runs in linear time), easy to extend to other 
protocols and easy to maintain because there is no model to train. 
In the past, to identify and prevent above-mentioned attacks, a number of statistical indica-
tors for DNS traffic were considered: increase in number of DNS packets, decrease in cache 
hit ratio, increase in average DNS queries of individual source IP addresses, increase in num-
ber of recursive queries, increase in number of source IP addresses within a limited time slot 
and decrease in ratio of resolved queries. We went one step further by considering several 
statistical indicators in relation with potentially periodic data traffic. Our method is quite ge-
neric and can be applied to other types of traffic as well. In particular, our scheme performs 
well in identifying all the events related to DDoS and compromising servers attacks. The con-
tributions of this work are the following: 
1. A new fast, generic approximate string matching algorithm for DNS anomaly detection. 
2. Simulative comparison between our technique and auto-regressive unsupervised scheme 
and other common regressors such as Linear Regression, Lasso, Random Forest and KNN, 
using DARPA 2009 dataset from IMPACT Cyber database.  
3. Simultaneous use of scale dependent and invariant similarity measures (mean squared error 
and cosine similarity) to predict anomaly in the DNS data traffic. 
The general idea of our solution is to identify similar periodic instances of investigated sta-
tistical indicators on the fly and to make a predictive suggestion based on historical data. The 
prediction is made by our extended approximate string matching algorithm based on KMP 
algorithm [32]. We can also control the length of historical data that we use during the algo-
rithm. As said above, our solution is very fast in terms of time and memory complexity, and 
can be applied to different types of traffic. Moreover, as it is shown by experimental results 
(Section 5), it greatly outperforms (in terms of precision) auto-regression model with many 
variables, Linear Regression, Lasso, Random Forest, KNN and quite speedy.  
This paper is organized as follows. We start with related work on DNS anomalies, then we 
present our approach and the solution with explanations. Next, we evaluate the proposed solu-
tion analytically (Section 4) and experimentally (Section 5) comparing it with auto-regression 
approach and other common regressors such as Linear Regression, Lasso, Random Forest and 
KNN. Finally, we conclude the paper and suggest further research. 
2 Related work 
A number of research works have been dealing with identifying of DNS anomalies. As men-
tioned above, popular technique used by cyber-criminals to hide their critical systems is fast-
flux. The ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee [1] released a paper giving a 
clear explanation of the technique . Jose Nazario and Thorsten Holz [2] did some interesting 
measurements on known fast-flux domains. Villamarn-Salomn and Brustoloni [3] focused 
their detection on abnormally high or temporally concentrated query rates of dynamic DNS 
queries. The research by Choi et al. [4] created an algorithm that checks multiple botnet char-
acteristics. Born and Gustafson [5] researched a method for detecting covert channels in DNS 
using character frequency analysis. Karasaridis [6] used the approach of histograms' calcula-
tions of request/response packet sizes using the fact that tracking and detecting the changes in 
the frequencies of non-conforming packets sizes lead to possible identification of DNS anom-
aly. Yuchi et al. [7] investigated DNS anomalies in the context of Heap’s law stating that a 
corpus of text containing N words typically contains on the order of cN
β
 distinct words, for 
constant c and 0<β<1. Cermák et al. [8] identified that only four DNS packet fields are useful 
for most of the DNS traffic analzing methods: queried domain name, queried record type, 
response code and IP address returned. Yarochkin et al. [9] presented an open source 
DNSPACKETLIZER tool to analyze DNS traffic in-real time. The analyzer calculates a Sta-
tistical Feature String for every event and stores it along with the query domain name and IP 
addresses (if such are known). The papers [12,13] investigated some statistical features of the 
domain name in the context of DNS traffic. The research described in [10] aimed detect the 
botnet traffic by inspecting the following parameters: Time-Based Features (Access ratio), 
DNS Answer-Based Features (Number of distinct IP addresses), TTL Value-Based Features, 
Domain Name-Based Features (% of numerical in domain name). Satam et al. [11] used a 
dnsgram which is a data structure the captures important properties of consecutive DNS que-
ries and replies. In [14] the authors presented an approach in which the flow of DNS traffic 
between the source and the destination DNS server is used to detect attacks. For taking care of 
Feature-Based Detection, variations of entropy based learning mechanisms were developed 
[15-18].  Based on the definition of context, there is a cause-effect relation among the features 
that characterize the context C and the corresponding consequences.  
   We note that some past attempts were made in order to bring unsupervised machine learn-
ing mechanisms to find DNS related anomalies. Raghuram et al. [19] proposed a method for 
detecting anomalous domain names, with focus on algorithmically generated domain names 
which are frequently associated with malicious activities. They [19] used the well-known 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) framework wherein the parameters of a probability 
model are found by maximizing the likelihood of a training data set under that model. Kirch-
ler et al. [20] presented modified k-means algorithm and evaluated it on a realistic dataset that 
contains the DNS queries. Chatzis and Popescu-Zeletin [22] study the effect email worms 
have on the flow-level characteristics of DNS query streams a user machine generates using 
similarity search over time series analysis. The authors in [21] show that they can correctly 
classify DNS traffic using clustering (k-means) analysis. 
3 Our Approach 
Our unsupervised approach is based on approximate string matching strategy as explained in 
the following subsections. 
3.1 General approach 
We consider the historical traffic feature (for example, the total number of DNS packets 
measured per each minute) as the text T, the last load traffic measurements as the pattern P 
and the currently measured load as E. The idea is to find a set S of the starting indices of non-
overlapping approximate appearances of P in T where the absolute difference between any 
two elements in S as at least |P|. Then we make a prediction Pred based on S and compare it 
to E. What does it mean "approximate appearance" of P in T? We use it to identify a possible 
periodicity in the history. In particular, we set up different values, α and β to control the ap-
proximate appearance of P in T. The parameter α controls the possible difference between 
each measurement in P versus corresponding measurement in T, while the parameter β gives 
an upper bound on the total difference between all the measurements in P versus correspond-
ing measurements in T. After the sequence S is found, we make a prediction Pred based on 
the average value of the measurements that are located immediately after the indices in S. 
(We also consider the boundary cases as well, for example the cold-start case when the se-
quence S could be empty as well). Visually, our solution works as shown in Figure 1. 
    In order to understand whether the anomaly happens in the current time, we compare the 
current measurements E with Pred as explained in the above paragraph. The comparison is 
made using the cosine similarity measure and the mean squared error.  
3.2 The Approximate KMP algorithm 
Below we present our matching algorithm and elaborate on the details of proposed solution. 
We must point out that approximate string matching strategy is based on Knuth-Morris-Pratt 
fast string matching algorithm [32], but can work, in fact, with any standard string pattern 
matching solution. We will also show how to use the algorithm in an incremental fashion in 
order to speed up the running time.  
The modified function π is defined as follows: 
π(P, α): 
        ret = [0] 
        for i in range(1, len(P)): 
            j = ret[i - 1] 
            while j > 0 and abs(P[j] - P[i]) > α: 
                j = ret[j - 1] 
            ret.append(j + 1 if abs(P[j] - P[i]) <= α else j) 
return ret 
  The total_error function computes the total difference between the pattern P and text T at 
given offset: 
total_error(P, T, offs): 
        total = 0 
        for i in range(len(P)): 
            total += abs(P[i] - T[offs + i])  
return total 
 
Finally, the approximate searching solution based on Knuth-Morris-Pratt algorithm and modi-
fied π function was designed. The returned array "ret" of indices contains the starting indices 
in text T where the approximate matches of P are found. The presented algorithm has, obvi-
ously, linear (in terms of T and P sizes) running time. 
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) shows the traffic load as the function of time, where the red part is the last load pattern P 
and the orange part is currently measured load E ; (b) the algorithm looks for the approximate ap-
pearances of P in T; (c) the predictions (in green) are made based on appearances we found in (b) 
stage; (d) the prediction Pred (in blue) for the currently measured traffic load E is made; if no cor-
relation between Pred and E exists, the anomaly is reported. 
search(T, P, α, β): 
        π, ret, j = π(P, α), [], 0 
        for i in range(len(T)): 
            while j > 0 and abs(T[i] - P[j]) > α: 
                j = π[j - 1] 
            if abs(T[i] - P[j]) <= α: j += 1 
            if j == len(P): 
                temp_j = j 
                j = π[j - 1] 
                if total_error(P, T, i-len(P)+1) <= β: 
                    ret.append(i - (temp_j - 1)) 
                    j=0 
 return ret  
 
3.3 Identifying anomaly 
We have used mean squared error and cosine similarity measures (plus additional parameters) 
in order to make the decision about a possible anomaly in the current data traffic. Assuming 
Pred is a vector of k predicted values and E is a vector of k observed values, the mean squared 
error is defined as: 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
1
𝑘
∑ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
− 𝐸𝑖)
2 (1) 
Mean squared error represents the difference between the actual measurements and the meas-
urement values predicted by the model. The choice of cosine similarity measure has been 
done due to the fact that cosine similarity is a scale invariant similarity measure. It is defined 
as: 
cos(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝐸) =
∑(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖·𝐸𝑖)
√𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖
2·√𝐸𝑖
2
 (2) 
However, the cosine similarity measure assumes that both vectors Pred and E are non-zero 
vectors which can be problematic in the context of measuring traffic, since it is possible 
sometimes to obtain zero values. In order to overcome this difficulty, we consider only the 
case when the vector Pred is non-zero vector. This is because no anomaly is expected in data 
when vector E contains only zero values. Also, for the case when the Pred vector does not 
exist (e.g. a cold-start case when no approximate matching has been found), we compare the 
currently observed measurements vector E with the pattern P. We note that these measure-
ments of vector E come exactly after the occurrence of pattern P at the end of data T. In case, 
where vector E values are significantly (order of magnitude) larger than vector P values, it 
may indicate a possible anomaly in data. 
4 Analysis 
First, we show the evaluation of our proposed technique to ensure that it does not suffer from 
cold-start problem. Next, we explain how to make our algorithm incrementally faster without 
the need of actual recomputing the data. 
4.1 Cold-start evaluation 
We are interested to analyze whether we can experience the problem of cold-start when ap-
plying our approximate matching solution. We have an alphabet of 10𝑑 letters (every value in 
pattern P is considered to be a letter), and since the length of P is k, the number of possible 
matching patterns of P in T without any error is 10𝑑𝑘. If we ignore the parameter β, the num-
ber of choices without β is (2𝛼 + 1)𝑘 and the total number of choices with parameter β is: 
𝛽 ≥ (
𝑘
⌊
𝛽
𝛼
⌋)
· (2𝛼 + 1)⌊
𝛽
𝛼
⌋ · max(1, 𝛽mod𝛼)      (3) 
In fact, if we assume that 𝑑 = 3, 𝑘 = 5, the number of possible patterns will be 1015. When 
we take α and β to characterize 10% and 25% of shift, respectively, of the maximum meas-
urement value that can be obtained (in other words 𝛼 = 100, 𝛽 = 250), the number of choic-
es for the particular approximate search of pattern P inside of historical data T is equal to at 
least (
5
2
) ⋅ (201)2 ⋅ 50 ≈ 10 ⋅ 4 ⋅ 104 ⋅ 50 = 2 ⋅ 107. In order to evaluate the number of times 
P may appear in T we proceed as follows. Let P be i.i.d. {𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘}, and the history T be 
i.i.d. {𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑙}. Let R be defined as: 
𝑅 =  (𝑙 − 𝑘 + 1) (
𝑘
⌊
𝛽
𝛼
⌋)
(2𝛼 + 1)⌊
𝛽
𝛼
⌋max(1, 𝛽mod𝛼)     (4) 
 The expectation of the number of times that the pattern P is included in the history is given 
by the following expression: 
𝐸(number of times that 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘 appears in 𝑦1, … 𝑦𝑙) =
𝐸 (∑ [𝑦𝑖
𝑙−𝑘+1
𝑖=1
, … , 𝑦𝑖+𝑘−1 = 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘]) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑦𝑖
𝑙−𝑘+1
𝑖=1
, … , 𝑦𝑖+𝑘−1 = 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘)
  (5) 
 
We can simplify this expression, by noticing the following: 
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⌋
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=  𝑅 ⋅ ∏ 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖)
𝑘
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           (6) 
On the other side, we have 
𝑅 ⋅ (𝑃(𝑦1 = 𝑥1))
𝑘
= 𝑅 ⋅ (∑ 𝑃({𝑦1 = some letter} ∩ {𝑥1 = the same letter})
10𝑑
𝑖=1
)
𝑘
 (7) 
Consequently, we can write that it equals the following:  
𝑅 ⋅ (∑ 𝑃(𝑦1 = some letter) ⋅ 𝑃(𝑥1 = the same letter)
10𝑑
𝑖=1
)
𝑘
= 𝑅 ⋅ (∑
1
102𝑑
10𝑑
𝑖=1
)
𝑘
 (8)  
In our case of above-mentioned example for length 𝑙=1440 (minutes in one day), we obtain 
that the expectation is 1436 ⋅ 2 ⋅ 107/1010 ≈ 3. We can even obtain a better bound for this 
expectation if we use inclusion-exclusion principle. In this case the number of choices with β  
𝛽 ≥ ∑ (−1)𝑖
𝛽 𝛼⁄
𝑖=0
· (
𝑘
𝑖
) · (
𝛽 − 𝑖𝛼 − 1
𝑘 − 1
)                        (9) 
and therefore 
𝑅 = (𝑙 − 𝑘 + 1) · ∑ (−1)𝑖
𝛽 𝛼⁄
𝑖=0
· (
𝑘
𝑖
) · (
𝛽 − 𝑖𝛼 − 1
𝑘 − 1
)    (10) 
For the given specific parameters provided above, we obtain that the expectation is at least 9. 
We should note that this evaluation takes into account only the case when the parameter α 
controls the possible difference between each measurement in P versus corresponding meas-
urement in T by original value (and not by absolute value, which is in fact done in practice). 
This analysis shows that our algorithm will not suffer from cold-start problem in general set-
ting. 
4.2 Incremental evaluation of the algorithm 
One of the interesting properties of our solution is that it allows to perform the incremental 
evaluations of the results avoiding recomputing the entire process over and over. For exam-
ple, when we iterate from the current pattern P to the next pattern P', we know that the first 
element of new pattern should be deleted, and the new element (the last one) should be insert-
ed. It means that by brute-force approach, we again need to recompute the function π for the 
new pattern P' from the beginning. Fortunately, we can do it much faster as follows. We do 
not delete the first element from the new pattern, but only insert the last element (in other 
words, the pattern grows up by one measurement). In this case, the function π should be up-
dated only once – for the newly inserted last element. Moreover, in the process of the search 
itself, during the comparison between the measurements in T with those that are located in 
new pattern P', we will make sure that the first element of the new pattern P' can match any 
element of T, thus, in fact, ignoring the first element of P'. We can continue with this ap-
proach over and over, generating new patterns, and ignoring each time the next element in the 
prefix of the current pattern. Eventually, when the size of current pattern P' grows up to twice 
size (or some constant times) of initial pattern, we can restart the next pattern having the ini-
tial size length and to compute the original function π. This allows us to significantly speed up 
the entire process. 
5 Evaluation 
We have evaluated our technique on DARPA 2009 dataset from IMPACT Cyber database. 
The DARPA 2009 dataset is created with synthesized traffic to emulate traffic between a /16 
subnet (172.28.0.0/16)  and the Internet. This dataset has been captured in 10 days between the 
3rd and the 12th of November of the year 2009. It contains, in particular, synthetic DNS 
background data traffic. The dataset is large (over 6Tb) and has a variety of security events 
and attack types that describes the modern style of attacks. In particular it contains the events 
related to the DDoS and compromising DNS servers attacks. This dataset has been already 
evaluated using the supervised learning techniques; see [23].  
 
 
  
The features we have looked at are: 
 Feature A: The total number of DNS packets per minute in the traffic. 
 Feature B: The number of malformed received DNS packets per minute, per each IP. 
 Feature C: The number of transmitted DNS packets per minute, per each IP. 
In order to evaluate the efficiency and the accuracy of our approach, we have compared it 
with auto-regression model (also, unsupervised method) and with other common regressors 
such as Linear Regression [28], Lasso [29], Random Forest Regressor [30] and KNN Regres-
sor [31]. The common regressors have trained with the predicted window lag. We note here 
that the use of auto-regression as a baseline is not new, see for example [24-27]. The valida-
tion of our results has been done using standard PC server with 12 cores, 32G RAM. The en-
tire traffic has been normalized for our string matching strategy. The normalization process 
has been performed according to the current logarithmic value of the average number of seen 
(per feature) packets. Consequently, the current error threshold 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 that we have 
used for error evaluation was computed as a squared value of log10−𝜀𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, where 
maxvalue is the current maximal number of seen (per feature) packets. Finally, parameters α 
and β were defined as: 
𝛼 = 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 · (1 + 𝜀) ·
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑃)
|𝑃|
, 𝛽 = 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 · 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑃)    (11) 
where the value of  mean(P)  denotes the average number of packets in pattern P. 
In order to evaluate the influence of each feature on the analyzed data traffic, we have as-
sociated an unique numerical value for each of the features.  Feature A has a score of 1, Fea-
ture B has a score of 2 and Feature C has a score of 4. In this way, we can control the rele-
vance of specific feature for the seek anomalies. For example, if we require the total score of 
currently evaluated traffic be larger than, e.g. 4, it means that we require that mean squared 
error and the cosine similarity will go over the thresholds for Feature C, and at least either 
Feature A or Feature B. The evaluated dataset has been provided with the ground truth events 
according to the intervals of time for their appearances. If the anomaly has been detected by 
our method within time interval that overlaps with the corresponding time interval in ground 
truth events file, we report this as true positive. If there is no such overlapping interval in 
ground truth events file, we report this as a false positive event. If there is any interval in 
ground truth events file which was not hit by any of our identified intervals of anomalies, it is 
considered as false negative event. All other cases are treated as true negatives.  
We have also investigated how the consideration of the length of lookback history corre-
lates with the running time of the evaluated solutions and the precision of our obtained re-
sults.  
Figure 2 contains True Positive Rate (TPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), F1 (harmonic 
mean of precision and sensitivity) measures for all methods: Approximate String Matching, 
Auto-Regression, Linear Regression, Lasso, Random Forest and KNN with lookback history 
length (in days) from set of {0.04, 0.08, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} days and scores larger 
than {4,5}. ASM abbreviation stands for Approximate String Matching solution, AR stands 
for Auto-Regression solution, LR for Linear Regression, RF for Random Forest and KNN for 
K-Nearest Neighbors. The graphs for FNR, TPR and F1 score (Fig. 2) clearly support that our 
ASM method is quite stable in regard with the lookback history length, opposite to the others. 
In the Auto-Regression model, Linear Regression and Lasso the longer history mean better 
results which are still worse when comparing with ASM, while the random forest behaves in  
(a)  
(b)  
 
(c)  
Fig. 2. (a) FNR (b) TPR (c) F1 for score 4,5 for all methods. ASM outperformed 
the other methods for all measures. 
 
the opposite trend. The second stable method was the AR, although it performed similar to the 
KNN method. F1 score shows almost perfect precision and recall for ASM. 
Table 1 below shows the absolute values for the mean FN, FP errors over all history for all 
methods. From Table 1 we can learn that in general, over all considered lookback history 
lengths, our method is much better than the others. The linear regression methods (LR and 
Lasso) performed the best false-positive (0), while their false negative were almost the worst. 
The AR performed worse FN but good (29.9 – 34.3) FP, while the ASM significantly reduces 
the number of FP and FN decisions (from up to 12 times for FP to 3 times for FN). 
 
 Mean FP Mean FN 
Scores > 4 5 4 5 
AR 5.1 0 29.9 34.3 
ASM 0.4 0 10 12.7 
LR 0 0 55.7 62.5 
LASSO 0 0 55.5 62.4 
KNN 1.5 0 29.3 37.8 
RF 1.6 0 67.4 69.5 
Table 1. Mean False Positive and False Negative decisions for all methods 
 
    For the Auto-regression method we evaluated the calculated lags by the AR. The results are 
shown in Figure 3. The lags are identical for all IPs, while the lags are larger for longer histo-
ry. 
 
Fig. 3. Auto-Regression lags w.r.t history length 
Additionally, we have evaluated the raw traffic for a few IPs to see the anomalies. Figure 4 
shows the sum of packets for IP 172.28.10.6 which serves as the Firewall. The traffic trend is 
periodical, where from 14:00PM to 12:00AM there are ~200K packets per hour and from 
12:00AM to 14:00PM there are ~75K packets per hour. At the 3-Nov and at the 12-Nov there 
are two peaks in traffic, which are reported as DNS attacks and are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Traffic of specific IP with 2 anomalies 
Figure 5 below shows the relation between the anomaly events found by our method (ASM) 
and the actual anomaly events in the system (GT) for the case of lookback history of length 1. 
In the upper, attacks related to IP 172.28.108.88 and in the bottom DOS attacks. As we can 
see, there is a difference of some single events per each day. 
 
 
 Fig. 5. Relation between ASM and ground truth events 
We also have evaluated the processing time for all the evaluation methods. First, we calculat-
ed the processing time for the entire dataset running, as shown in Figure 6(a) below; this is 
useful for offline scenario, when an organization wants to find anomalies on all historical data 
it has. In this scenario we train a model (when it is required by the evaluation method) every 1 
minute for the updated data (shift in 1 minute), and predict the future values using this model. 
Obviously, if a method has an incremental mode like our solution, it is much faster than the 
others. In Figure 6, the results without incremental mode are presented. Alternatively, we 
show in Figure 6(b), the 1-time query processing time which is useful for online scenario. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. (a) Entire dataset processing time for all meth-
ods and (b) 1-time query processing time 
 
In the 10 days processing time, the auto-regression technique performed worst in terms of 
running time, and it is very inefficient in comparison to the others including our solution. For 
example, for half-day lookback history, auto-regression evaluation takes more than one day of 
run for the offline scenario, while the approximate string matching is near order of magnitude 
faster, taking only a few minutes. In the 1-time query processing time the results are similar, 
while our solution runs quite fast and can be deployed as the online solution due to its incre-
mental mode option. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we have introduced and analyzed the performance of approximate string match-
ing as one of the unsupervised machine learning techniques applied to the problem of detect-
ing anomalies in DNS traffic. Our method is quite generic and can be applied to other types of 
traffic as well. Our analysis has shown a superiority of our method (both in terms of anomaly 
detection precision and running time) over the standard unsupervised auto-regression model 
as well as against other common regressors such as Linear Regression, Lasso, Random Forest 
and KNN. One of possible extensions could be generating the combined features normalized 
data (instead of looking at them separately and applying a total score mechanism). Another 
possibility is to consider the traffic offline data in reverse order. 
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